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 Abstract 
 
This study provides an empirical perspective on alternative irrigation policies for 
allocating limited water to agricultural production in Egypt. Positive mathematical 
programming is used for model calibration. Three policy options for Egypt are tested: 
water pricing, water complementary input factor taxes, and output taxes. The results of the 
research show that: 1) water pricing needs to be much higher than the recovery cost in 
order to be effective in limiting irrigation water use; 2) at a higher tax rate, fertilizer and 
energy taxes are effective in reducing the irrigation water demand while maintaining 
adequate welfare levels; 3) a pesticide tax is less effective than fertilizer or energy taxes; 
and 4) an output tax on sugar cane and rice would decrease irrigation water demand 
substantially while allocating land to other crops which are less water intensive and have 
higher market values.  
 1 
Introduction 
Over the last few decades, the promotion of rational use of water resources and the 
adoption of appropriate irrigation policies to encourage water conservation has become an 
increasingly critical issue in many developing countries. According to a study conducted 
by the International Water Management Institute, many regions including Northern China, 
North Africa, and Northern Sub-Saharan Africa will encounter  fresh water shortage 
problems by 2025 (Seckler et al). 
The agricultural sector is the largest consumer of water in developing countries. 
Coupled with the growing demand for water and increasingly unstable water supply, 
access to irrigation water is steadily decreasing. One solution to overcome this obstacle at 
relatively affordable costs and in a timely manner is to promote water conservation; more 
specifically, the practice of efficient allocation of available water resources to more 
productive uses among different users. Water allocation efficiency
1 is generally considered 
very low in developing countries, despite the large contribution of irrigated agriculture 
towards reducing the problem of hunger (Seckler, Barker, and Amarasinghe). Successful 
conservation projects and increasing irrigation efficiency is regarded as a new way to meet 
future increasing water demand.  
Nevertheless, there are many competing views held by economists and policy 
makers from different countries and regions about the best ways this issue should be 
addressed. Most stakeholders believe that access to water is an inalienable human right, a 
social necessity, and that water is essential for maintaining a stable and healthy social and 
                                                 
1 Water allocation efficiency is often referred to the amount of irrigation water that should be allocated 
among crops in order to achieve the most profitable overall use. If large volumes of water are allocated to 
crops producing low value, the total amount of value generated will be low and the water allocation is 
inefficient.                                
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economic environment for many regions. However, others tend to view water as a private 
good: one that should be allocated through competitive market pricing. Briscoe, Perry et 
al., and Hellegers further clarified the notion about treating water as an “economic good” 
as distinguished from valuing and charging for water. Economic efficiency is only one of 
the basic criteria for helping make good decisions about the optimal use and allocation of 
water among potential users if the choice is made based on a socio-economic trade-off 
composed of social equity and ecological sustainability (Hellegers). This argues that a 
multidisciplinary approach should be taken to address water allocation issues.  
Invention and implementation of such policy options for allocating water to more 
productive uses remains a challenge in many countries. Sensitive physical, social, 
institutional, political and economic contexts of many regions and countries have left water 
pricing a debated policy option. Limited acceptable ranges of pricing have weakened the 
effectiveness of water pricing (Molle; De Fraiture and Parrey; Perry; Ogg and Gollehon). 
High transaction costs embodied in the implementation of water pricing has limited its 
benefits.  Slow institutional change characterizes many developing countries that depend 
upon irrigation agriculture (Saleth and Dinar; Tsur and Dinar; Rosegrand and Binswanger; 
Sampath). Nevertheless, economic efficiency criteria are attractive to most economists. 
Focus has been on the belief that resource allocation efficiency is achieved by equating 
cross sector marginal benefits (Dinar and Loehman). 
One obstacle facing water pricing policies in developing countries is lag effects of 
past water pricing policies. In many countries where irrigated agriculture plays an 
important role, farmers believe low or zero charges are justified. This belief is usually 
reflected in their political systems (Mohmoud Abu-Zeid). Many countries may also lack   3 
the tradition, experience, and appropriate institutions to price irrigation water, and some 
water scarce countries have adopted macroeconomic policies that have negative effects on 
agriculture in general and water in particular (Diao, Roe, and Doukkali). Most developing 
countries provide irrigation and domestic water supply systems at subsidized rates. By 
doing so they can secure water and food supplies, protect public health, and avoid 
opposition from farmers and urban poor to raising water prices (Mohmoud Abu-Zeid).  
The research presented here addresses these issues by examining alternatives to 
water pricing that might provide another means of increasing water use efficiency in 
Egypt. The paper examines three strategic policy options using Agricultural Sector Model 
of Egypt (ASME) (Siam): 1) water pricing; 2) taxation on water complementary input 
factors; and 3) taxation on water intensive crop output. 
 
Policy Options 
 Water Pricing 
Water pricing methods (Tsur and Dinar) have covered: volumetric pricing, output pricing, 
area pricing, tiered pricing, two-part tariff pricing, and market pricing. Tsur and Dinar and 
Johansson examined in great detail the various pricing options available, and the 
contributions of these options to the goal of achieving economic efficiency of water use. 
Water pricing policy in this study refers to volumetric pricing mechanisms where irrigation 
water is priced based on consumed quantities. Just as the criterion of pricing any scarce 
resource, the main norm of pricing water is efficiency. With water pricing, it is assumed 
that farmers compare their marginal benefits with the marginal costs they face when 
deciding on change in irrigated crop patterns. If all farmers face the same price, every one   4 
of them will modify their water use to maximize the total profit from using available water. 
Therefore, effective water prices can affect users’ allocation plans toward more profitable 
water application, hence achieving water allocation efficiency. 
Some district analyses have demonstrated that similar pricing policies may have 
very different impacts under different conditions (Tsur et al.), as reflected in the shape 
(elasticity) of the derived demand curves. Farms with steep (inelastic) demand curves will 
be less responsive to price increases when policy makers or project designers do not have a 
clear understanding of the shape of demand and supply curves. Without this information, it 
is hard to find the most sensible price that will optimize water use. Tiwari and Dinar 
reviewed the World Bank’s Irrigation and Drainage portfolio. They found that economic 
incentives are not adequately used in many water allocation projects. Many of the incentive 
measures adopted, such as water pricing mechanisms, are based on the “user pays” 
principle. But how far the adoption of these incentive measures will help to promote 
various facets of water use efficiency is uncertain in many of these projects.     
Water Complementary Input Factors Tax 
Strong complementarities between inputs (fertilizer, pesticide, and energy) and 
irrigation water have been recognized in agronomy and agricultural engineering. These 
inputs have a substantial impact on water productivity and farm-level decisions 
(Wichelns).  Applying tax policy to adjust water complementary input factors might be a 
feasible instrument to manage irrigation water demand with the advantage of easier 
implementation than direct water price modification (Tsur and Dinar). It may be 
particularly attractive in Egypt where nearly all agriculture is irrigated.  
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      Fertilizer  
Dry water-soluble fertilizer must be dissolved into water before it can be applied 
(Burns). Feinerman demonstrated that a tax on nitrogen fertilizer will motivate farmers to 
adopt optimal time paths of nitrogen and irrigation water inputs to achieve a certain level 
of reduction on total nitrogen leaching. A more recent study by the IFA and FAO 
examined crop yield response to irrigation and fertilizer and farmers’ decision response to 
fertilizer price from the analysis of experiment and survey data (IFA et al). They concluded 
that (1) fertilizer use may tend to increase as the average number of irrigations increases; 
(2) fertilizer use correlates positively with adequacy of irrigation supplies, and the 
marginal productivity of fertilizer is higher where households have access to adequate 
irrigation supplies; and (3) farmers respond to fertilizer prices when making decisions 
regarding fertilizer use, and farm-level credit constraints limit the use of fertilizer in some 
areas.  
 Pesticides 
Repetto first looked at how pesticide subsidies interfered with farmers’ judgments 
about pesticide use in nine key countries and how the subsidy policy in these countries has 
encouraged this potential harmful practice. Removing the distortion or increasing the price 
of pesticides could influence farmers’ production decisions, and as a consequence affect 
the farmers’ allocation of water resource. A case study in Costa Rica (Agne, Fleischer and 
Waibel) has shown that pesticide taxation can achieve significant reductions of pesticide 
use. However, most of the research on excessive pesticide use has centered on the health 
and environmental issues caused by careless application or over use of pesticide, and 
providing agricultural producers with adequate incentives to use less pesticides. Very little   6 
attention has been given to how pesticide prices affect crop patterns with respect to 
irrigation water allocation.  
Energy  
Irrigation often requires considerable amounts of electricity or diesel fuel for pumping 
water. Many countries, including the United States, China, Morocco, Iran, Mexico and 
Egypt, use ground water intensively in their agricultural sectors. Electricity subsidies have 
contributed substantially to the rate of increase in crop yields following the Green 
Revolution by providing farmers with an affordable and reliable water source in these 
regions.   
Water –Intensive Output Tax 
Water-Intensive output taxes applied to high water-consuming and low value crops 
would influence the production level of such crops.  Output taxes do not directly target 
water consumption, but have an indirect effect on crop patterns. To reduce tax liability, 
farmers often switch to other crops not taxed or put land into fallow. These strategies 
change the production of water consuming crops and intend to meet the goals of decreasing 
the demand for irrigation water. Clearly, in this case, an output tax is economically 
equivalent to a price reduction for the crop. 
 
Characteristics of Egypt’s Irrigated Agriculture 
The Egyptian economy depends heavily on the agricultural sector, which functions as a 
source to support non-agricultural sector growth. In 2001, the Nile River supplied about 
57.5 billion of cubic meters of water to Egypt. About 80% of this water was used in   7 
agriculture. There are about 3.3 million ha (7.85 million Feddan
2) of agricultural land in 
Egypt. More than 90% of this land lies within the Nile basin and delta. Only about 2% of 
the agricultural land is rain fed. There are three cropping seasons in Egypt (Siam): winter 
(November-May), summer (April-October) and Nili (July-October). The main winter crops 
are wheat, berseem (Egyptian clover) and broad beans. Among summer crops, maize, rice 
and cotton are dominant. Vegetable crops such as tomato and potato are planted in all three 
seasons.  
Farmers do not have to pay for their irrigation water. The country faces water 
scarcity due to increasing irrigation and industrial demand. Water administration is very 
centralized. A FAO report on Egypt (FAO, 2000, P41-42) stated the water policy concerns 
and that water pricing only has minimal impact on water conservation, although it is 
needed to raise financial resources to develop and maintain the huge water infrastructure. 
The report also indicated that there is no general strategy or model that could be used for 
cost recovery policy for Egypt to meet the revenue needs of the system, distribute the cost 
equitably, provide incentives for efficient use of water and capital, keep the tariff rate 
structure simple so it can be well understood and implemented, and protect the 
environment.   
  However, irrigation cost recovery is an important process to capture revenue for 
irrigation suppliers. Perry reviewed the actual costs incurred for operating and maintaining 
the infrastructure for water delivery and disposal in Egypt. His calculations are mainly 
based on the updated separable costs and remaining benefit (SCRB) approach. Table 1 
presents representative results of the operation and maintenance cost for agricultural use of 
water calculated by Perry. The cost recovery of the irrigation water used in old land is 
                                                 
2 1 Feddan = 0.42 ha   8 
about 11.696 LE/000M
3 which is much lower than the marginal value 56 LE/000M
3 
obtained by Hazell et al.  In this research, the cost recovery price is used as one of the 
water pricing levels to simulate the optimal solution on crop mix to maximize producer 
and consumer surplus under the water pricing policy. 
 
Research Methodology 
Agricultural Sector Model of Egypt (ASME) 
Agricultural sector models are used as tools for analyzing quantitative economic problems 
in the agricultural sector in many studies (Jabara and Thompson; Hazell and Pomareda; 
Fajardo, McCarl and Thompson; Britz et al.). Such models are designed to analyze policy 
impacts on agriculture and therefore provide scenarios or suggestions to policy decision 
makers.   
  The Agricultural Sector Model of Egypt (ASME) (Siam) used in this research is a 
static partial equilibrium model in which social welfare in the form of consumer and 
producer surplus from agriculture based commodities are maximized subject to various 
constraints including resource, technical, and policy constraints. To achieve maximized 
welfare, an equilibrium demand and supply is required. Demand and supply balance of the 
agricultural products are the key equations to solve for activity levels.  
The data set includes 1999 national and regional levels of land, labor, water 
resource availability and requirements, yields and fodder byproducts. The production of 27 
crop commodities and 5 animal commodities in 8 regions are included. The ASME has 
updated prices and cropping patterns to 2001. The updated data is used as the base to 
calibrate the model. 
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Positive Mathematical Programming (PMP) 
The ASME has been calibrated by the authors using Positive Mathematical 
Programming (PMP) to generate decision behavior when simulating impacts on the 
variables of interest under different policy options.  The general PMP set up is: 
Max    x c' x p' −  
s.t. 
b Ax ≤             [] π  
0 x x ≤               [] λ  
0 x ≥  
Where p is the n by 1 vector of commodity prices; c is the n by 1 vector of costs 
levels for each x;  0 x  is  n by 1 vector of observed activity levels;  π are dual variables of 
the resource constraints; λare the dual variables of the calibration constraints which are 
employed to specify a nonlinear objective function such that the marginal cost of the 
activities are equal to their respective prices at the base activity levels  0 x . Given that the 
implied variable cost function is convex in all activity levels, the solution to the resulting 
programming problem is a “boundary point, which is the combination of binding 
constraints and first order conditions” (Howitt, 1995, p.330).    
When a quadratic cost function is employed, the general formula of this cost 
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Derived Demand Curve for Irrigation Water 
Derivation of demand curves is necessary to evaluate any water pricing policy. 
Demand curves illustrate the relationship between the willingness to pay for water and the 
water capacity of a given region. They may provide reasonable and feasible scales while 
setting up pricing policies for curtailing water demand.  
Water demand functions have been derived using limited information via 
mathematical programming models (Shunway; Kulshreshtha and Tewari; Chakravorty and 
Roumasset; Bontemps and Couture).  The scheme to obtain such a demand function is as: 
(a) For a given output price, estimate the quantity of water maximizing the profit of the 
agricultural sector; (b) vary the level of water quantities to deduce the shadow prices under 
different levels of water; (c) plot the derived demand curve over quantity and the 
corresponding shadow price to derive the demand function.  
Crop production is assumed to be Leontief technology. Optimal crop production is 
calculated under various resource constraints and prevailing input-output prices. The water 
shadow price (λ ) constraint is the marginal value of irrigation water. The derived demand 
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Where  j L is the land allocated to crop j;  j y  is yield of crop j;  j a is coefficient 
between water and yield of crop j;  ij z is quantity of other inputs i required for crop j per 
unit land;  ij b is coefficient between other inputs i and yield of crop j;  j p is price for output 
crop j;  j r is price vector for input factor i ;  i Z is available input levels for input factor i ; 
j π is the unit land return on crop j ; λ is the water shadow price.  
Equation (1) is the objective function of the producer’s profit maximizing problem. 
Equation (2) defines the unit land returns on crop j, and equation (3) is the available land 
constraint. Equation (4) is the constraint on available irrigation water. The levels of the 
constraint are varied between the interval [0, W*], where W* is the maximum water 
capacity in the country. Each iteration yields a new water shadow price (λ). This shadow 
value is used to find derived demand for water at every level of W. By successively solving 
the producer’s maximization problem this way, the derived demand for water for a given 
country can be traced. Equation (5) is a constraint for other input factors, and equation (6) 
is the non-negativity constraint on land. 
 Scenario Design 
Three major scenarios are simulated using the modified ASME model: (1) a water 
pricing policy; (2) an input tax policy; and (3) an output tax policy. Table 2 summarizes 
these scenarios. The water pricing scenario observes the effects under different water 
pricing levels (cost recovery, and three shadow price levels). The input factor tax scenario 
includes three sub-scenarios: Nitrogen Fertilizer (N-Fertilizer), Pesticides, and Energy. The 
output tax scenario taxes paddy (rice) and sugar cane production since these crops are 
irrigation water intensive and have lower profits level among all other crops in Egypt. 
   12 
The results of the policy simulation are presented in three categories: 1) the extent 
to which complementary input taxes and high water-consuming crop output taxes can be 
used as a proxy for water pricing; 2) farmers’ response in crop production under different 
policy scenarios; 3) the effects of policy measures on changes in consumer and producer 
welfare gains.  
The welfare measurement for this research is composed of consumer and producer 
surplus to agricultural commodities consumed by households, including crop and crop-
based commodities and livestock commodities. These goods are mainly primary goods. 
Consumer and producer surplus represents how much benefit consumers and producers can 
extract at equilibrium. It is a well used measure for welfare change under different policy 
options giving an overall base for ranking preferences amongst a series of policies.  
Water conservation is measured by the decreasing rate of demand for irrigation 
water after implementing a certain policy. Water demand is based on the crop pattern and 
water requirements for each crop. Water demand due to technology change is reflected by 
the yield response to deficit irrigation water usage on most of the crops. Therefore, two 
factors will affect water conservation: reduction in the production of water intensive crops 
and less water used on these crops. 
Land reallocation and crop commodity production level is another important aspect 
that reflects farmer behavior in response to different policy alternatives. It can provide a 
trace of where the input factors, including water and fertilizer, are allocated, and how much 
a difference a specific policy can make on influencing farmers’ input decision.  It is also an 
indicator for agricultural policy makers and irrigation water managers while looking at any 
effectiveness of feasible policies.    13 
Results 
Water Pricing Policy Scenario 
The demand for irrigation water in Egypt is inelastic when the price is low according to a 
derived demand curve for irrigation water (Figure 1). The irrigation water is the actual 
amount of water received by field crops. It is the amount of water used for agricultural 
irrigation after taking off the effect of conveyance efficiency, evaporation loss and the 
rainfall capacity.  The shadow prices were deduced from different irrigation water 
constraints.  
Table 3 gives the welfare change and irrigation water demand changes when using 
different water pricing levels. The first price level is 0.011696 LE/M
3 which is the cost 
recovery price calculated by Perry in 1996. The second, third and fourth price levels are 
the deduced shadow price levels found by changing the irrigation water constraint to less 
than the binding level by 5%, 10% and 20% respectively. The results show that demand for 
irrigation water is inelastic when water price is set low. To reduce irrigation water by 10%, 
the water price has to be at least 0.083 LE/M
3, which is about seven times as much as the 
cost recovery price. This induces a decrease in welfare by 5.63%.                   
  Crop production changes per thousand tons (000t) and percentage (%) to its base 
level are reported in table 4. The production level decreased on almost all crops except 
citrus, which is fixed in the model. The largest change happens with berseem (Egyptian 
clover), maize, paddy (rice), sugar beet and sugar cane when water price increases from 0 
to 0.17 LE/M
3. Sugar cane and paddy (rice) rank the highest two crops in using irrigation 
water per unit are in Egypt. However profitability for these crops is lower than tomato, 
potato and other vegetables. Berseem, maize and sugar beet may not use as much irrigation   14 
water as sugar cane and paddy production, but their profitability are in the relatively low 
ranks.  
  Table 5 describes the reductions in irrigation water. When the water price level is 
0.01169 LE/M
3, the total irrigation water reduction is about1.83% of the base level. The 
reduction mainly comes from long berseem (-0.24%), summer maize (-0.16%), paddy (-
0.21%) and sugar cane (-0.66%).  
As water price increases, these crops are also the main source of irrigation water 
reduction. At the water price level 0.083 LE/M
3, summer maize, paddy, and sugar cane 
production contribute most to the deduction of irrigation water demand. The irrigation 
water demand reduction in summer maize accounts for 1.16% of the total, paddy accounts 
for 1.72%, and sugar cane accounts for 2.45%.  At the price level of 0.17 LE/M
3, the 
irrigation water usage falls by 19.79%. The contribution of long berseem to this irrigation 
water reduction level is 1.18%, summer maize 2.36%, paddy 3.54%, sugar cane 5.06%, 
and wheat 1.59%. 
 Taxation on N-Fertilizer, Pesticides and Energy 
Different tax levels on water complementary input factors including nitrogen 
fertilizer (N-fertilizer), pesticides and energy were simulated to find the best levy rate 
options to approximate the solution under a water pricing scheme. 
  N-fertilizer scenario results are presented in table 6 and table 7. The tax rate range 
for N-fertilizer ranges from 0% (base level) to 300%. N-fertilizer tax will affect the 
cropping decision and hence the demand for irrigation water. However, until the price of 
N-fertilizer increases by more than 50%, there are no appreciable changes in reduction of 
irrigation water use. When the N-fertilizer tax increases by 300%, the welfare decreases   15 
8.55%. The demand for irrigation water decreases by 11.24% at this tax level (Table 6). 
The prominent changes in crop production are from sugar cane and sugar beet as the tax 
rate on N-fertilizer increases. This is reasonable because these crops comparatively need 
more N-fertilizer input than other crops in Egypt.  
Soybean production also decreased as the N-fertilizer cost increases. Soybean 
production in Egypt uses N-fertilizer, although nitrogen fertilizer is not needed in most 
situations if it is properly inoculated. However, the N-fertilizer has to be used in Egypt 
because there is a deficient in nitrogen in the sandy and clay soils and low nitrogen use 
efficiency, 20% in some places, and never exceeds 50% (Ferguson et al.).  
Soybean production in Egypt has been very low (about 15 thousand tons in 2001). 
Table 7 shows that irrigation water reduction will not be affected much by soybean, but by 
wheat, sugar cane, sugar beet, paddy, summer maize, and Nili maize. Summer vegetables 
and tomato production also decrease as the tax level increases. However, the irrigation 
water for winter vegetables increases because the increasing price of N-fertilizer 
encouraged more land to be used to produce winter vegetables which consume less N-
fertilizer and water. 
           In the pesticide tax scenario, changing the pesticides cost has limited effects on both 
welfare level and irrigation water demand (Table 8). When pesticides cost increases 200%, 
the irrigation water demand only decreases by -2.35%, while the welfare level decreases by 
-3.85%.  To obtain a higher reduction in irrigation water demand, pesticide cost should be 
even higher. At the 300% tax level, the welfare level decreases by 5.72%. However, 
irrigation water demand is only 3.18% less than the base level.    16 
       From the perspective of crop production, the most affected crop is sugar beet. Almost 
no noticeable reduction occurred with sugar cane when the tax rate ranges from 0 to 50%. 
Most of the other crops are affected by about the same magnitude as the pesticide tax rate 
increase since the cost of pesticide per unit land on most of the crops in Egypt are similar. 
Pesticide taxes decreases the production of tomatoes and vegetables as well.  
According to Table 9, the contribution of irrigation water reduction comes most 
from paddy production and almost equally from the rest of the main crops in Egypt. Even 
at the 300% tax level, sugar cane only contributes 0.09% to the total reduction of irrigation 
water.   
Results from the energy tax scenario are summarized in Table 10. “Energy price” 
here refers to the water pumping costs used in crop production. Comparing with pesticide 
scenario, table 10 shows that irrigation water demand decreases in a higher rate in this 
scenario as the pumping costs increases. About 10% of irrigation water reduction happened 
when energy tax is as high as 300%, and the welfare level decreases 6.64% from the base 
level. Increasing of pumping costs affects most the production of sugar beet, sugar cane, 
maize and soybean. Fava bean, lentil, maize, paddy, sesame, sorghum, and wheat 
production also decrease, although not as much as sugar beet and sugar cane. The high 
market value crops, such as potato, onion, tomato and other vegetables change less 
compared to other crops even when the pumping cost is increased by 300%. There are 
negligible effects on cotton production.  
         At the 300% energy tax level, the total 9.47%  reduction of irrigation water is mainly 
composed of water use decreasing from sugar cane (-2.37%), paddy (-2.01%), summer 
maize (-1.28%), Nili maize (-0.68%), long berseem (-0.67%), and wheat (-0.81%) (Table   17 
11). A similar result patterns happen at the 75% to 200% energy tax level. Other than these 
staple crops, water consumption of rest of the crops will not be affected very much.  
Taxation on Sugar cane and Paddy 
Taxation on sugar cane and paddy production decreases irrigation water demand as 
expected. Increasing the tax rate from 5% to 50%, the welfare level will change from -
0.53% to -3.97% while the irrigation water demand will change from -1.11% to -13.91% 
(Table 12).  
Production reduction only happens with sugar cane and paddy. However, the 
production of profitable crops, such as lentil, increases up to 26.58% along with the 
increasing tax on sugar cane and paddy. A slight increase also happens with wheat and 
barley production.  
The main contributions to irrigation water reduction are from sugar cane and paddy. 
Although winter vegetable and wheat demands more irrigation water as the output tax rate 
increases, the change in demand for water is very small. Wheat only needs 0.07% more of 
the total base irrigation water and winter vegetable will need only 0.28% more of the total 
base irrigation level, even the output tax rate is 50% (Table 13).  
At the output tax level of 40%, total irrigation water reduction decreases 10.92%. The 
main contribution to this irrigation water deduction are from sugar cane (-5.88%) and 
paddy (-5.49%) (Table 13). Except for a slight decrease in long berseem, Nili vegetable 
and barley, the rest of the crops increase irrigation water demand by 0.45%. 
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Conclusions 
Water pricing policy works well in reducing the irrigation water use in Egypt when the 
water price level is high. Cost recovery price levels may help with financial scarcity 
problems. However, it is not very effective in limiting irrigation water demand. Not all the 
water complementary input factor taxes will work well in Egypt. Increasing N-fertilizer 
and energy costs up to 200%-300% of the current level will affect the irrigation water 
demand significantly without decreasing very much welfare, although this level of input 
tax rate may not be reasonable or realistic. A pesticide tax may not be a good driver in 
decreasing irrigation water demand and keeping the welfare level similar in Egypt since 
higher pesticide cost will not affect the water intensive crops substantially. The output tax 
tool may work better compared with input factor tax.   For a detailed comparison of these 
policy scenarios in welfare and reduction of irrigation water demand, please see Table 14.   
The research undertaken here is very important given the lack of information on the 
subject of irrigation policy regarding water complementary input factors and high water-
consuming crop. The results have shown that it is a beneficial area of research for Egypt 
and should receive more attention. However, taxation policy on input and output factors 
policies are intervention tools that affect not only production, but agriculture as a whole. In 
a long run, price, market condition, cropping patterns, production technologies will all 
experience adjustment. Policy scenario outcomes in reality will not be as smooth as in our 
results. Effects on certain markets and the implications of international trade are left to 
other studies since this study only uses a partial equilibrium model and centers on farmers’ 
decision making based on input and output data, and crop production budget structure.     19 
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Table 1 Operation and Maintenance (O&M) Cost for Water Supply in Egypt 
Sector
US $ LE
Old Lands Agriculture 3.44 11.696
New Lands Agriculture 3.34 11.356
Source:Perry (1996)
Cost
Exchange Rate     
1$ = 3.4 LE
 
 
Table 2   Description of policy scenarios in Egypt 
 Scenarios Water(1)     Water (2) Water (3) Water (4) N- Fertilizer Pesticides Energy Paddy(Rice) Sugar Cane
Water Pricing √  √  √  √ 
Input Factor Tax  √  √  √
Output Tax  √  √
Water (1): Using cost recovery price level calculated by Perry in 1996
Water (2): Using shadow price at the 5% reduction of irrigation water
Water (3): Using shadow price at the 10% reduction of irrigation water
Water (4): Using shadow price at the 20% reduction of irrigation water  
 
Table 3   Welfare and Irrigation Water Demand Changes under Different Water Pricing Levels. 
level Change level Change
million LE % bcm %
Pw  = 0 48.7 34.9
Pw  = 0.01169 48.3 -0.83% 34.28 -1.83%
Pw  = 0.036 47.47 -2.52% 33.26 -4.75%
Pw  = 0.083 45.95 -5.63% 31.43 -10.01%
Pw  = 0.17 43.37 -10.93% 28.01 -19.79%
bcm : billions of cubic meters
pw: water pricing level
LE/M3
Water Price level Welfare Irrigation Water Demand
 
 
   20 
Table 4 Crop Production Levels and Percentage Changes from the Base under Different Water Price Levels. 
Crop Production Base
000t 000t % 000t % 000t % 000t %
Barley 93.990 -0.86 -0.92% -1.91 -2.04% -4.68 -4.98% -10.22 -10.88%
Berseem 61732.416 -286.77 -0.46% -792.38 -1.28% -1896.89 -3.07% -3985.50 -6.46%
Citrus 6 0 7 6 . 4 3 1 --------
Fava Bean 424.551 -9.57 -2.25% -22.71 -5.35% -54.13 -12.75% -84.87 -19.99%
Flax 67.940 -0.12 -0.17% -0.36 -0.52% -0.92 -1.35% -1.88 -2.77%
Ground Nut 207.000 -1.82 -0.88% -4.87 -2.35% -11.64 -5.62% -23.05 -11.13%
Legumes 34.987 -0.41 -1.17% -0.95 -2.70% -2.77 -7.91% -6.52 -18.63%
Lentils 3.764 0.01 0.13% 0.03 0.80% -0.20 -5.37% -1.44 -38.12%
Maize 6906.005 -84.45 -1.22% -264.41 -3.83% -611.81 -8.86% -1187.34 -17.19%
Onion 796.569 -5.88 -0.74% -15.74 -1.98% -36.13 -4.54% -72.34 -9.08%
Paddy 5225.863 -64.44 -1.23% -200.78 -3.84% -543.44 -10.40% -1113.47 -21.31%
Potato 1086.311 -2.96 -0.27% -9.12 -0.84% -20.97 -1.93% -41.12 -3.79%
Cotton (G45) 0.077 0.00 -0.88% 0.00 -2.60% 0.00 -5.19% -0.01 -10.39%
Cotton (G70) 77.835 -0.74 -0.95% -2.27 -2.92% -5.23 -6.72% -10.72 -13.77%
Cotton (G88) 13.821 -0.12 -0.83% -0.36 -2.57% -0.82 -5.92% -1.68 -12.13%
Cotton (G80) 88.406 -1.57 -1.77% -4.86 -5.49% -11.23 -12.70% -21.20 -23.97%
Cotton (G83) 39.079 -0.59 -1.50% -1.81 -4.62% -4.17 -10.66% -8.53 -21.83%
Cotton (G85) 88.532 -0.92 -1.04% -2.86 -3.23% -7.19 -8.12% -14.73 -16.63%
Cotton (G86) 132.095 -0.98 -0.74% -3.02 -2.29% -6.97 -5.28% -14.29 -10.82%
Cotton (G89) 153.815 -1.39 -0.90% -4.31 -2.80% -11.07 -7.20% -22.68 -14.74%
Sesame 32.989 -0.47 -1.43% -1.46 -4.42% -3.36 -10.17% -6.72 -20.37%
Sugarbeet 2857.714 -172.25 -6.03% -509.67 -17.83% -1201.74 -42.05% -2438.96 -85.35%
Sugarcane 15387.614 -506.90 -3.29% -1559.41 -10.13% -3802.32 -24.71% -8575.94 -55.73%
Sorghum 792.039 -10.57 -1.33% -33.05 -4.17% -75.50 -9.53% -151.31 -19.10%
Soybean 14.847 -0.62 -4.18% -1.90 -12.76% -4.44 -29.90% -8.26 -55.63%
Tomato 6290.013 -20.04 -0.32% -55.15 -0.88% -127.24 -2.02% -264.00 -4.20%
Vegetables 11007.709 -27.29 -0.25% -73.33 -0.67% -161.43 -1.47% -320.77 -2.91%
Wheat 6369.155 -54.20 -0.85% -138.31 -2.17% -346.77 -5.44% -777.66 -12.21%
Citrus production is fixed in the model
Pw= 0.01169 LE/M3 Pw = 0.036 LE/M3 Pw =0.083 LE/M3 Pw =0.17 LE/M3
 





mcm mcm % mcm % mcm % mcm %
Citrus 4114.46 - - - - - - -27.44 -0.08%
Favabean 370.69 -9.14 -0.03% -21.75 -0.06% -50.50 -0.14% -79.74 -0.23%
Cotton (G80) 355.20 -6.30 -0.02% -19.55 -0.06% -45.19 -0.13% -85.09 -0.24%
Cotton (G86) 444.57 -3.31 -0.01% -10.18 -0.03% -23.46 -0.07% -48.10 -0.14%
Cotton (G89) 500.15 -4.86 -0.01% -15.12 -0.04% -39.82 -0.11% -81.58 -0.23%
Groundnut 553.42 -3.97 -0.01% -60.31 -0.17% -80.49 -0.23% -200.59 -0.57%
Long berseem  3999.04 -84.43 -0.24% -122.01 -0.35% -193.59 -0.55% -410.34 -1.18%
Nili maize 619.43 -17.25 -0.05% -59.38 -0.17% -121.72 -0.35% -252.33 -0.72%
Paddy 5617.22 -72.16 -0.21% -224.50 -0.64% -599.70 -1.72% -1235.84 -3.54%
Short berseem (winter)  554.15 -7.34 -0.02% -24.57 -0.07% -38.43 -0.11% -75.65 -0.22%
Sugar cane 3053.27 -229.75 -0.66% -429.20 -1.23% -855.85 -2.45% -1767.45 -5.06%
Summer maize 4709.17 -54.34 -0.16% -165.04 -0.47% -403.52 -1.16% -825.30 -2.36%
Summer sorghum 922.92 -11.89 -0.03% -35.93 -0.10% -83.77 -0.24% -175.26 -0.50%
Summer tomato 601.35 -7.35 -0.02% -25.36 -0.07% -54.61 -0.16% -110.16 -0.32%
Summer vegetables 1090.42 -8.87 -0.03% -18.95 -0.05% -44.61 -0.13% -88.81 -0.25%
Wheat  4158.97 -38.22 -0.11% -85.78 -0.25% -230.69 -0.66% -556.49 -1.59%
Winter vegetables 710.50 16.36 0.05% -130.91 -0.37% -213.58 -0.61% -227.33 -0.65%
Others 2543.81 -95.67 -0.27% -209.29 -0.60% -414.35 -1.19% -661.49 -1.89%
Total 34918.73 -638.47 -1.83% -1657.82 -4.75% -3493.87 -10.01% -6908.98 -19.79%
mcm:  million cubic meters
%:  the percentage change of irrigation water demand on the base level of total irrigation water demand for all crops
Irrigation water: rainfall not included
Paddy: 125 days growing season paddy
Others: crop which consums less than 1% of the total irrigation water at the base level is grouped in "others"
Pw = 0.01169 LE/M3 Pw = 0.036 LE/M3 Pw =0.083 LE/M3 Pw =0.17 LE/M3
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Table 6 Welfare, Irrigation Water Demand, and Crop Production Level Change from the Base for N-
Fertilizer Scenario. 
N-Fertilizer Tax Level Base 25% 50% 75% 100% 200% 300%
      Welfare and Irrigation Water Demand Change from the Base (percentage)
Welfare: Consumer and 
Producer Surplus 48.692   Billion LE    -0.76 -1.52 -2.26 -3.00 -5.84 -8.55
Irrigation Water 
Demand 34.919  bcm -0.99 -2.01 -2.88 -3.77 -7.45 -11.24
Crop Items Base                        Crop Production Change from the Base (percentage)
000 ton
Barley 93.990 -0.12 -0.13 -0.05 -0.01 0.25 -0.33
Berseem 61732.416 0.09 0.17 0.27 0.36 0.65 0.69
Citrus 6076.431 - - - - - -
Fava Bean 424.551 -0.53 -0.96 -1.25 -1.66 -3.52 -7.20
Flax 67.940 -0.25 -0.51 -0.76 -1.02 -2.12 -3.18
Ground Nut 207.000 -0.47 -0.89 -1.26 -1.62 -3.09 -4.67
Legumes 34.987 -0.15 -0.10 0.12 0.34 0.97 -0.55
Lentils 3.764 1.75 3.92 6.18 8.41 15.81 10.43
Maize 6906.005 -1.39 -2.79 -4.20 -5.60 -11.32 -17.00
Onion 796.569 -0.82 -1.63 -2.44 -3.25 -6.43 -9.74
Paddy 5225.863 -0.36 -0.97 -1.45 -1.93 -4.88 -7.33
Potato 1086.311 -0.75 -1.53 -2.30 -3.07 -6.22 -9.33
Cotton (G45) 0.077 -0.69 -1.16 -1.63 -2.10 -3.98 -5.86
Cotton (G70) 77.835 -0.67 -1.35 -2.02 -2.70 -5.39 -8.09
Cotton (G88) 13.821 -0.60 -1.19 -1.78 -2.38 -4.75 -7.12
Cotton (G80) 88.406 -1.53 -3.04 -4.56 -6.09 -12.19 -18.31
Cotton (G83) 39.079 -1.39 -2.77 -4.16 -5.54 -11.09 -16.63
Cotton (G85) 88.532 -0.74 -1.49 -2.24 -2.99 -6.42 -9.63
Cotton (G86) 132.095 -0.53 -1.06 -1.59 -2.12 -4.23 -6.35
Cotton (G89) 153.815 -0.59 -1.20 -1.80 -2.40 -5.29 -7.94
Sesame 32.989 -0.74 -1.49 -2.23 -2.98 -5.95 -8.94
Sugarbeet 2857.714 -12.59 -25.10 -37.45 -49.83 -94.27 -97.26
Sugarcane 15387.614 -3.19 -6.31 -9.42 -12.54 -25.33 -40.78
Sorghum 792.039 -1.05 -2.12 -3.18 -4.26 -8.33 -12.32
Soybean 14.847 -2.28 -4.54 -6.81 -9.07 -18.13 -27.09
Tomato 6290.013 -0.75 -1.51 -2.25 -2.99 -5.95 -8.99
Vegetables 11007.709 -0.23 -0.45 -0.67 -0.89 -1.77 -2.71
Wheat 6369.155 -1.13 -2.23 -3.28 -4.34 -8.67 -13.86 
 
Table 7 Decomposition of Irrigation Water Demand Reduction at Different N-fertilizer Tax Level.  




















% of  Base 
Total
Citrus 4114.461 - - - - - - - -
Favabean 370.693 -3.41 -0.01 -4.41 -0.01 -9.32 -0.03 -22.60 -0.06
Groundnut 553.419 -5.97 -0.02 -7.97 -0.02 -15.98 -0.05 -24.80 -0.07
Long berseem  3999.037 -52.38 -0.15 -48.26 -0.14 -32.90 -0.09 -31.18 -0.09
Nili maize 619.427 -70.52 -0.20 -94.91 -0.27 -187.86 -0.54 -286.62 -0.82
Summer maize 4709.168 -151.62 -0.43 -201.79 -0.58 -413.13 -1.18 -621.18 -1.78
Paddy 5617.223 -81.29 -0.23 -108.39 -0.31 -271.26 -0.78 -406.67 -1.16
Short berseem (winter)  554.147 -3.64 -0.01 -6.84 -0.02 -7.04 -0.02 -7.28 -0.02
Sugar cane 3053.274 -287.73 -0.82 -382.84 -1.10 -773.18 -2.21 -1246.83 -3.57
Cotton (G80) 355.198 -16.23 -0.05 -21.67 -0.06 -43.37 -0.12 -65.12 -0.19
Cotton (G86) 444.568 -7.06 -0.02 -9.41 -0.03 -18.81 -0.05 -28.23 -0.08
Cotton (G89) 500.153 -8.85 -0.03 -11.80 -0.03 -26.88 -0.08 -40.33 -0.12
Summer sorghum 922.921 -24.67 -0.07 -32.78 -0.09 -67.63 -0.19 -103.53 -0.30
Summer tomato 601.352 -16.61 -0.05 -23.46 -0.07 -46.97 -0.13 -67.92 -0.19
Summer vegetables 1090.415 -17.59 -0.05 -21.28 -0.06 -36.93 -0.11 -53.49 -0.15
Winter vegetables 710.496 24.94 0.07 24.50 0.07 22.66 0.06 34.63 0.10
Wheat 4158.972 -117.30 -0.34 -152.77 -0.44 -298.72 -0.86 -504.33 -1.44
Others 2543.81 -166.17 -0.48 -210.91 -0.60 -372.93 -1.07 -450.62 -1.29
Total 34918.73 -1006.11 -2.88 -1314.97 -3.77 -2600.22 -7.45 -3926.09 -11.24
200% 300% 75% 100%
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Table 8 Welfare, Irrigation Water Demand and Crop Production change for the pesticide tax scenario. 
Pesticide Tax Level Base 25% 50% 75% 100% 200% 300%
      Welfare and Irrigation Water Demand Change from the Base (percentage)
Welfare: Consumer and 
Producer Surplus 48.692   Billion LE  -0.49 -0.98 -1.46 -1.95 -3.85 -5.72
Irrigation Water 
Demand 34.919  bcm -0.19 -0.46 -0.81 -1.19 -2.35 -3.18
Base                        Crop Production Change from the Base (percentage)
000 ton
Barley 93.990 0.05 -0.06 -0.21 -0.27 -0.65 -0.89
Berseem 61732.416 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.12
Citrus 6076.431 --- - - -
Fava Bean 424.551 -1.58 -3.34 -5.25 -6.82 -14.33 -18.57
Flax 67.940 -0.06 -0.12 -0.18 -0.24 -0.49 -0.74
Ground Nut 207.000 -0.04 -0.17 -0.43 -0.67 -1.30 -1.91
Legumes 34.987 0.15 0.22 0.10 -0.11 -0.17 -0.24
Lentils 3.764 -0.08 -0.37 -0.71 -0.97 -2.11 -3.39
Maize 6906.005 -0.09 -0.31 -0.50 -0.80 -1.57 -2.36
Onion 796.569 -0.47 -1.02 -1.54 -2.15 -4.31 -6.45
Paddy 5225.863 -0.05 -0.35 -0.73 -0.98 -1.95 -2.97
Potato 1086.311 -0.58 -1.19 -1.79 -2.43 -4.86 -7.30
Cotton (G45) 0.077 -0.46 -0.70 -0.94 -1.18 -2.15 -3.11
Cotton (G70) 77.835 -0.35 -0.69 -1.04 -1.38 -2.77 -4.15
Cotton (G88) 13.821 -0.31 -0.61 -0.92 -1.22 -2.44 -3.66
Cotton (G80) 88.406 -0.42 -0.90 -1.29 -2.33 -4.65 -6.96
Cotton (G83) 39.079 -0.50 -1.02 -1.54 -2.07 -4.12 -6.16
Cotton (G85) 88.532 -0.24 -0.77 -1.17 -1.56 -3.12 -4.70
Cotton (G86) 132.095 -0.27 -0.54 -0.81 -1.09 -2.17 -3.26
Cotton (G89) 153.815 -0.32 -0.66 -1.01 -1.36 -2.72 -4.09
Sesame 32.989 0.13 0.12 0.01 -0.12 -0.24 -0.35
Sugarbeet 2857.714 -11.59 -23.32 -34.78 -46.22 -91.77 -97.02
Sugarcane 15387.614 0.01 -0.05 -0.10 -0.31 -0.64 -0.98
Sorghum 792.039 -0.08 -0.13 -0.19 -0.30 -0.58 -0.86
Soybean 14.847 0.08 -0.09 0.09 -1.75 -3.48 -5.20
Tomato 6290.013 -0.69 -1.40 -2.15 -2.88 -5.76 -8.62
Vegetables 11007.709 -0.27 -0.56 -0.87 -1.17 -2.36 -3.53
Wheat 6369.155 -0.13 -0.36 -0.59 -0.84 -1.75 -2.60 
Table 9 Irrigation Water Demand Decomposition and Changes under Different Pesticide Tax Levels 




















% of  Base 
Total
Citrus 4114.461 - - - - - - - -
Favabean 370.693 -19.47 -0.06 -25.38 -0.07 -53.20 -0.15 -68.69 -0.20
Groundnut 553.419 -1.27 - -2.57 -0.01 -5.97 -0.02 -9.30 -0.03
Long berseem  3999.037 -6.43 -0.02 -29.21 -0.08 -49.13 -0.14 -62.22 -0.18
Nili maize 619.427 -15.06 -0.04 -21.22 -0.06 -42.70 -0.12 -65.02 -0.19
Summer maize 4709.168 -8.28 -0.02 -18.28 -0.05 -35.54 -0.10 -52.88 -0.15
Paddy 5617.223 -41.11 -0.12 -55.28 -0.16 -110.29 -0.32 -167.80 -0.48
Short berseem (winter)  554.147 0.67 - 1.54 - -0.50 - -0.63 -
Sugar cane 3053.274 -3.71 -0.01 -9.89 -0.03 -20.20 -0.06 -30.74 -0.09
Cotton (G80) 355.198 -4.56 -0.01 -8.28 -0.02 -16.55 -0.05 -24.75 -0.07
Cotton (G86) 444.568 -3.62 -0.01 -4.83 -0.01 -9.66 -0.03 -14.49 -0.04
Cotton (G89) 500.153 -5.50 -0.02 -7.37 -0.02 -14.74 -0.04 -22.25 -0.06
Summer sorghum 922.921 -0.44 - -1.03 - -1.99 -0.01 -2.79 -0.01
Summer tomato 601.352 -18.35 -0.05 -23.07 -0.07 -52.01 -0.15 -76.07 -0.22
Summer vegetables 1090.415 -18.46 -0.05 -23.18 -0.07 -42.05 -0.12 -60.15 -0.17
Winter vegetables 710.496 -5.65 -0.02 1.50 - 0.13 - -3.06 -0.01
Wheat 4158.972 -21.27 -0.06 -32.49 -0.09 -66.05 -0.19 -97.61 -0.28
Others 2543.81 -111.69 -0.32 -157.15 -0.45 -300.98 -0.86 -350.10 -1.00
Total 34918.73 -284.18 -0.81 -416.16 -1.19 -821.43 -2.35 -1108.55 -3.17
200% 300% 75% 100%
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Table 10 Welfare, irrigation water demand and crop production level change for the energy tax scenario. 
Energy Tax Level Base 25% 50% 75% 100% 200% 300%
      Welfare and Irrigation Water Demand Change from the Base (percentage)
Welfare: Consumer and 
Producer Surplus 48.692   Billion LE  -0.58 -1.16 -1.73 -2.30 -4.51 -6.64
Irrigation Water 
Demand 34.919  bcm -0.79 -1.62 -2.41 -3.11 -6.19 -9.47
Base                        Crop Production Change from the Base (percentage)
000 ton
Barley 93.990 -0.30 -0.57 -0.70 -0.89 -1.59 -2.91
Berseem 61732.416 -0.30 -0.65 -0.93 -1.26 -2.60 -4.06
Citrus 6076.431 - - --- -
Fava Bean 424.551 -2.01 -4.08 -5.66 -7.80 -15.86 -19.62
Flax 67.940 -0.20 -0.40 -0.59 -0.80 -1.69 -2.54
Ground Nut 207.000 -0.51 -1.06 -1.50 -1.95 -3.74 -5.59
Legumes 34.987 -0.13 -0.43 -0.36 -0.31 -0.32 -2.30
Lentils 3.764 0.38 0.96 1.80 2.54 4.07 -7.17
Maize 6906.005 -0.86 -2.01 -3.02 -4.03 -8.20 -12.32
Onion 796.569 -0.17 -0.51 -0.74 -0.99 -1.92 -2.94
Paddy 5225.863 -0.87 -1.75 -2.62 -3.50 -8.19 -12.30
Potato 1086.311 -0.19 -0.49 -0.74 -0.99 -2.09 -3.15
Cotton (G45) 0.077 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.21 -0.22
Cotton (G70) 77.835 - - --- -
Cotton (G88) 13.821 - - --- -
Cotton (G80) 88.406 0.53 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02
Cotton (G83) 39.079 - - - - 0.01 -
Cotton (G85) 88.532 0.07 0.13 0.20 0.26 - -
Cotton (G86) 132.095 - - - - 0.01 -
Cotton (G89) 153.815 0.08 0.14 0.22 0.29 - -
Sesame 32.989 -0.65 -1.51 -2.27 -3.02 -6.04 -9.07
Sugarbeet 2857.714 -6.24 -12.64 -18.92 -25.13 -51.11 -76.71
Sugarcane 15387.614 -1.89 -4.04 -6.00 -7.98 -16.21 -27.11
Sorghum 792.039 -0.90 -1.87 -2.81 -3.75 -7.42 -11.20
Soybean 14.847 -2.02 -7.00 -10.49 -13.98 -27.93 -41.80
Tomato 6290.013 -0.36 -0.75 -1.11 -1.47 -2.91 -4.46
Vegetables 11007.709 -0.16 -0.36 -0.51 -0.69 -1.37 -2.11
Wheat 6369.155 -0.58 -1.27 -1.79 -2.38 -4.76 -7.92 
Table 11 Irrigation Water Demand Decomposition and Changes at Different Energy Tax Level 



















% of  Base 
Total
Citrus 4114.461 - - - - - - - -
Favabean 370.693 -21.25 -0.06 -29.12 -0.08 -58.95 -0.17 -73.65 -0.21
Groundnut 553.419 -7.63 -0.02 -10.20 -0.03 -20.44 -0.06 -31.02 -0.09
Long berseem  3999.037 -107.15 -0.31 -120.00 -0.34 -176.52 -0.51 -233.41 -0.67
Nili maize 619.427 -58.70 -0.17 -79.25 -0.23 -153.91 -0.44 -236.64 -0.68
Summer maize 4709.168 -108.10 -0.31 -143.66 -0.41 -298.44 -0.85 -448.36 -1.28
Paddy 5617.223 -151.27 -0.43 -201.72 -0.58 -467.04 -1.34 -700.83 -2.01
Short berseem (winter)  554.147 -12.60 -0.04 -17.61 -0.05 -28.12 -0.08 -37.96 -0.11
Sugar cane 3053.274 -182.68 -0.52 -242.93 -0.70 -493.39 -1.41 -827.14 -2.37
Cotton (G80) 355.198 0.08 - 0.08 - 0.11 - 0.08 -
Cotton (G86) 444.568 0.01 - 0.01 - 0.02 - - -
Cotton (G89) 500.153 1.45 - 1.93 0.01 0.01 - 0.01 -
Summer sorghum 922.921 -27.04 -0.08 -35.93 -0.10 -72.52 -0.21 -108.46 -0.31
Summer tomato 601.352 -8.19 -0.02 -13.20 -0.04 -28.02 -0.08 -38.53 -0.11
Summer vegetables 1090.415 -14.64 -0.04 -17.98 -0.05 -30.53 -0.09 -42.64 -0.12
Winter vegetables 710.496 22.40 0.06 20.97 0.06 15.55 0.04 32.59 0.09
Wheat 4158.972 -63.30 -0.18 -80.82 -0.23 -155.20 -0.44 -282.92 -0.81
Others 2543.81 -100.68 -0.29 -115.43 -0.33 -194.39 -0.56 -278.58 -0.80
Total 34918.73 -839.31 -2.40 -1084.85 -3.11 -2161.76 -6.19 -3307.48 -9.47
200% 300% 75% 100%
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Table 12   Welfare, Irrigation Water Demand and Crop Production Level Change for the Output Tax 
Scenario. 
Output Tax Level Base 5% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
      Welfare and Irrigation Water Demand Change from the Base (percentage)
Welfare: Consumer and 
Producer Surplus 48.692   Billion LE  -0.53 -1.03 -1.94 -2.74 -3.41 -3.97
Irrigation Water 
Demand 34.919  bcm -1.11 -2.37 -5.21 -7.96 -10.92 -13.91
Base                        Crop Production Change from the Base (percentage)
000 ton
Barley 93.990 0.26 0.39 0.71 0.86 0.86 0.86
Berseem 61732.416 0.16 0.28 0.36 0.43 0.43 0.43
Citrus 6076.431 - - - - - -
Fava Bean 424.551 0.97 1.88 2.68 3.11 3.11 3.12
Flax 67.940 0.04 0.08 - - - -
Ground Nut 207.000 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.10
Legumes 34.987 0.92 1.64 3.17 3.85 3.85 3.85
Lentils 3.764 5.67 11.59 22.01 26.58 26.58 26.58
Maize 6906.005 0.19 0.18 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04
Onion 796.569 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.12
Paddy 5225.863 -3.83 -7.71 -17.08 -25.62 -34.16 -42.70
Potato 1086.311 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
Cotton (G45) 0.077 -0.22 -0.21 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22
Cotton (G70) 77.835 - - - - - -
Cotton (G88) 13.821 - - - - - -
Cotton (G80) 88.406 0.41 - - - - -
Cotton (G83) 39.079 - - - - - -
Cotton (G85) 88.532 0.19 0.36 - - - -
Cotton (G86) 132.095 - 0.01 - - - -
Cotton (G89) 153.815 0.21 0.40 - - - -
Sesame 32.989 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09
Sugarbeet 2857.714 0.62 1.10 0.27 0.30 0.30 0.30
Sugarcane 15387.614 -7.79 -15.73 -31.74 -48.97 -67.16 -85.34
Sorghum 792.039 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Soybean 14.847 1.24 0.11 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
Tomato 6290.013 0.06 0.09 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.18
Vegetables 11007.709 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.10
Wheat 6369.155 0.41 0.75 1.20 1.44 1.44 1.44 
Table 13   Irrigation Water Demand Reduction Decomposition under Different Output Tax Level. 



















% of  Base 
Total
Citrus 4114.461 - - - - - - - -
Favabean 370.693 12.52 0.04 14.61 0.04 14.62 0.04 14.63 0.04
Groundnut 553.419 1.65 - 1.77 0.01 1.77 0.01 1.78 0.01
Long berseem  3999.037 17.40 0.05 21.00 0.06 21.05 0.06 21.11 0.06
Nili maize 619.427 3.17 0.01 3.19 0.01 3.21 0.01 3.24 0.01
Summer maize 4709.168 -1.31 - -1.58 - -1.53 - -1.51 -
Paddy 5617.223 -958.02 -2.74 -1437.28 -4.12 -1916.23 -5.49 -2395.16 -6.86
Short berseem (winter)  554.147 3.76 0.01 4.48 0.01 4.48 0.01 4.48 0.01
Sugar cane 3053.274 -969.37 -2.78 -1496.38 -4.29 -2053.22 -5.88 -2610.05 -7.47
Cotton (G80) 355.198 - - - - - - - -
Cotton (G86) 444.568 - - - - - - - -
Cotton (G89) 500.153 - - - - - - - -
Summer sorghum 922.921 -0.06 - -0.08 - -0.08 - -0.08 -
Summer tomato 601.352 0.18 - -0.02 - -0.01 - -0.01 -
Summer vegetables 1090.415 -3.28 -0.01 -3.59 -0.01 -3.96 -0.01 -3.60 -0.01
Winter vegetables 710.496 1.36 0.00 23.23 0.07 23.23 0.07 23.23 0.07
Wheat 4158.972 82.23 0.24 99.36 0.28 99.35 0.28 99.34 0.28
Others 2543.81 -8.48 -0.02 -6.70 -0.02 -5.34 -0.02 -14.39 -0.04
Total 34918.73 -1818.25 -5.21 -2777.97 -7.96 -3812.65 -10.92 -4857.01 -13.91
40% 50% 20% 30%
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Table 14   Summary of Welfare and Irrigation Water Demand Changes (in percentage) for All Scenarios 




Water (1) -0.83% -1.83%
Water (2) -2.52% -4.75%
Water (3) -5.63% -10.01%





























Water (1): Using cost recovery price level calculated by Perry in 1996
Water (2): Using shadow price at the 5% deduction of irrigation water
Water (3): Using shadow price at the 10% deduction of irrigation water
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